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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT \V. HANKS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

JOHN \V. TCI_l~ER,
Ctah State Prison,

"T arden,

Case No.
)

10541

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPOIWENT

STA'l'E)IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant Robert "~. Hanks appeals from
the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
hy the Honorable Stewart ~I. Hanson, Judge of the
Distnct Court of the Third Judicial District.

DISPOSITION IN LO\YER COURT
. On N oYember 24, 1965, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court
1

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, allell'in th
.
e· g at h1>
p 1ea o f gm1ty was coerced and that he was bei '
· dm
· t he U ta h S tate P rison
·
· violation of h'ng de.
tame
m
. . 1 . h
I
IS COii·
shtutiona rig ts. nterrogatories were served l
. .
.
on lit
petitioner and an answer to lus petition was du!v fil d
denying the contention made by the appellant that\;
was being held in violation of the Constitution of !ht
United States and the Constitution of Utah. On De.
cember 15, 1965, a pretrial was held in which the court
restricted the issues for the time of trial as to whether
the petitioner's plea was coerced and whether the petitioner had been advised as to the consequences of hi)
plea of guilty. Answers to the interrogatories were
filed and hearing was held on January 7, 1966. On
January 20, 1966, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
Judge, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment denying the appellant the relief
sought by habeas corpus.
RELIEI<-. SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the district
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
· t he f oIIowmo
· a statement. oi,
Respondent submits
.
.
. t' for a writ ol
facts. The petitioner m his app1ica ion
.
I
a of gmltY was
. .
h h'
habeas corpus md1cated t at ·is P e
.
· b.
.
h t
d promise of pro a
entered on the basis of t rea s an a
2

In his answer to interrogatories, the peti· dicated that at the time of his preliminary
t1oner 111
br;ffing at Provo, h~ received a .copy of ~he .complaint
i · I ,.·as read to him, ·was advised of his right to an
\\'Jl!C l "
·ittornei·, and waived preliminary hearing (R. 16). At
'. 1 ~ tim~ of the hearing before the district court on the
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, no
mdence was offered to indicate that the appellant was
not proper}~· afforded a preliminary he3:ring. The appellant onh· indicated that he could not recall a preliminary hearing.
The appellant testified (R. 41) that he was arrested in Price, Utah, on the charge for which he is
presently being confined. He stated that subsequent
to his arrest, he was confronted by several police officers
he could not identify, who were screaming and yelling
at him and told him that if he would plead guilty, he
would get probation but if he did not, he would be sent
to prison (R. 42). The same day, the petitioner was
taken to Provo by two Provo police officers (R. 43).
The appellant was unable to identify the officers but
testified that they told him that if he plead guilty, he
would get out in a month, but that if he did not, he
'"ould be in jail a long time. The appellant testified
that he advised the district court at the time of his
arraignment that he did not want a lawyer because he
thought he would get probation (R. 44). He acknowledged that at the time of arraignment, the court advised
him that if he entered a plea of guilty, it could be very
serious (R. 45). The appellant further testified that
.

R

·J \.

tion 1. · '"'·

3

it was several weeks after his arrest in Price and t _
.
portahon
to p rovo b ef' ore h e appeared for his ran~
liminary hearing in Provo ( R. 50) . He indicated ~~~ 1
his only conversations with the police officers occurr;rl
on the day of his arrest and while he was being tak·en
to Provo ( R. 51) . He could not identify the officer.i
and it was from two to three weeks thereafter that br
appeared in court for arraignment (R. 51). Tlit
appellant had only a sixth-grade education (R. 53
but had been in trouble for misdemeanors and juvenile
offenses before and had been in the State Industrial
School (R. 52). Exhibit P-1 is a transcript of the
arraingnment of the petitioner in the district court.
The appellant was eighteen years of age at the time
of his arraignment (Exhibit P-1, page 2). At that
time the following occurred:
1

"THE COURT: Do you have an attorney
[to] represent you?
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE'\VMAN,JR.:
No, sir.
MR. ROBERT HANKS: No, sir.
THE COURT: You have legal rights and
may have an attorney of you w-ish?
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NEWMAN, JR.:
No, sir.
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Do you want to proceed
without one?
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN,JR.:
Yes, sir.

4

MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: Yes, sir.

THE COVR'f: You are charged here with
felonv ·which is a serions offense that could relJ.11. punishment of being sent to the State
Prison Ji yon axmt an attorney you may have
und
.JlR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN, JR.:
No, sir.
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: No, sir.

:ult
'l

THE COFRT: You are ready for arraignment at this time?
.JIR. TANAS JOSEPH NE"\Vl\i1AN, JR.:
Yes, sir.
:\IR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The clerk will read the Information.
(''Thereupon the Information was read to both
defendants by Evans Smith, Deputy Clerk.)

THE COURT: The record may show that
each of the defendants have been handed a copy
of the Information.
Let me advise both of you again you have legal
rights and may have a attorney to represent you
if you desire, or you may take time to consider
this, or you may enter a plea at this time by
answering guilty or not guilty to this charge in
the Information.

'Vhat do you want to do, Mr. Newman?
MR. TAN.AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN, JR.:
I plead guilty.

THE COURT: You plead guilty. And Mr.
Hanks?
5

MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS· I I
guilty."
·
P ead
The appellant was, therefore, advised three t'1mes
that if he wanted an attorney, he could have on e. I n
each instance, he advised the court he would proceed
without the assistance of an attorney. At one point, the
court asked the district attorney as follows:
"THE COURT: This is not one of those
cases where it's depriving an owner of a motor
vehicle, I hope?"
The district attorney replied:
"MR. SORENSEN: No, your Honor. There
is a difference of opinion as to what that statute
means. The Utah Court has said the slightest
asportation is larceny. But this case is not ont
that would come within the misdemeanor statute."

During the appellant's arraignment, the court ,
stated:
"THE COURT: 'Vould you like to have
the matter referred to the Department so they
can determine whether or not you can be placed
on probation?"
Thus, the appellant was aware of the need of a pre·
trial investigation to consider the eligibility of his pro·
bation. The district attorney stated at the end of the
arraignment:

''re

"MR. SORENSEN:
are not about to
recommend anything on the part of the State
until we have an investigation ~nd ~eport m~~;
by the Department. But Louisiana is a mem

6

ot the compad. It depends on how you check
out."

,ponse ' tbe court stated:
1n re~
"THE COURT: It will be August the 6th.

Tirne for pronouncing judgment in this matter
vill be ~et for August 6, 1965, at 9 :00 a.m. The
"'~~e is referred to the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole for an investigation and
report and recommendation."

On July 30, 1965, the matter came before Judge
Harding for pronouncement of judgment. The record
reflects (P-2, page 2):
"MR. SORENSEN: This matter is before
your Honor for pronouncement of judgment.
THE COURT: Do you have an attorney to
represent you, .Mr. Hanks?
MR. ROBERT YV. HANKS: No.
THE COURT: Do you wish to have one?
MR. ROBERT

,V. HANKS: No, sir.

*

*

*

THE COCRT: The probation report is not
good. I hate to send you over to the State Prison .

"r

. ~ wonder if we could make some other dispos1t10n of your case?
ould you object to having
a continuance for one week to see whether we
can ~ake some other arrangements other than
sendmg you to the State Prison?
MR. ROBERT

"r·

HANKS: No, sir."

The facts, therefore, disclose that the appellant
was fully aware that probation was not guaranteed and

7

that he was being considered for probatio
.
n on1y 011
his record. Further, the record discloses that the
.
. d h" .
appe[.
1ant agam
waive
is right to counsel · Subsequent]y
on August 6, 1965, the court sentenced the a II·'
.
.
ppe ant
to the State Prison for the mdeterminate ter m prr;.
vided by law (Exhibit P-3) .
Based upon the above facts appearing at the time
of the appellant's hearing on his application for a writ
of habeas corpus, Judge Stewart M. Hanson entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that tht
appellant's plea was voluntarily entered after full ad·
vice as to his right to counsel and the possible consequences and seriousness of his plea (R. 25-26). The
trial court further found that the appellant's conten
tion that he was promised probation was not factuaUy
meritorious (R. 26).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD CLEARLY
SUPPORTS 'l' HE DETERMINATION OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE APPEL·
LANT'S PLEA WAS NOT INDUCED BY
PROMISES OR THREATS AND WAS WITH·
OUT LEGAL MERIT.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in concluding that the appellant's plea of guilty.was
not induced by promises or threats. It is submitted
8

'al eourt's finding has adequate support in
that tIie tfl ,
.
.
.
d and consequently there is no basis for retile recor
• . .
the trial court's decision.
f
I
rersa o
'l'l1e onfr• eYidence offered in support of the appel·, . tention that his plea was induced by promises
lanr s c011
.
•.
;. threats ,ms the appellant's testimony to the effect
11
that , 0 me police office1s in Price told him at the time
oi his arrest that if he plead guilty, he ·would get proliation, but that if he plead not guilty, he would go to
pil. He further testified that on the same day, Provo
City officers who took him to Provo advised him to sit
tigl~t and that if he plead guilty, he would only get a
month in jail, but that if he plead not guilty, it would
he longer. On the other hand, the appellant was unable
to proYide any identity as to the officers who had made
these statements and was obscure as to the exact nature
of their threats and inducements. His testimony conceming the incident in Price is at best indefinite. The
only testimony that is specific is that there were some
officers in a room who yelled at him and that the alleged
statement was made. At no time did the appellant
testify that he was actually promised probation. Further, the fact that he was unable to give any reasonable
identification of the officers who allegedly made the
statements lends substantial doubt as to the credence
of his contention. In addition it was several weeks after
the alleged incident that the appellant was brought
before a committing magistrate and there advised of
~Is rights. At the time of arraignment, he made no inlllcahon to the court that he expected probation or

9

that he had been threatened or in any way 1· d
.
n uced t1
plead gmlty other than the fact that he w
. J
.
as gu1ltv
Prior to the actual en:ry of the appellant's plea, ti;;
court expressly told him that he was charged with a
felony which was a serious offense "that could l
resu t
by punishment of being sent to the State Pr'Ison. "
Therefore, the appellant was well aware of the pOSSJ·
bility of his being sent to prison before he actualli·
entered his plea of guilty. In addition the appellai;t
had previously been institutionalized at the State Jn.
dustrial School, appeared at juvenile courts, and had
been arrested on prior occasions. He was, therefore, noi
unfamiliar with court procedure and was also well aware
of his prior record which would reasonably lead a person
to conclude that prison was a definite possibility. Fur·
ther, the prior criminal involvement of the appellant
itself tends to detract from the veracity of his testimony.
It is well established that an individual seeking
release from custody by petition for a writ of habeas
corpus has the burden of proof to demonstrate to the
court that he is entitled to release. Ex parte Riddle, 51
Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal. Rep. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962);
39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, § 100; 25 Am. Jur.,
Habeas Corpus § 150. Further, in this case the
facts at the time of hearing were resolved against
the appellant. In this situation the evidence will be
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination since it had the opportunity of hearmg
the evidence first hand and appraising the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses. It was incumbent on the

10

t ·n the instant case to carry the burden of
responden 1
.
.
ow
that
he
was
entitled
to
a
writ
of habeas
h
proo f to s
. ;., incumbent on the appellant at this stage
corpus. It ·.
,
.
to demonstrate that the trial courts resolut10n of the
. t ·as wbollv unreasonable. Generally, the appeltac
s \\ "
!ant has the burden of demonstrating his right to relief
bv clear and convincing evidence. Wilson v. Hand,
!SI Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 1009 (1957); Montgomery
r. Hand, 183 Kan. 118, 325 P.2d 69 ( 1958); Applirntion of Gaskill, 335 P.2d 1088 (Okla. Crim. 1959).
,J

In addition the courts have generally recognized
that unsupported or uncorroborated statements of a
petitioner for habeas corpus will not in and of themselves support the burden of proof in the absence of
some compelling reason to demonstrate the clear truthfulness of the petitioner's testimony. Hicks v. Hand,
189 Kan. 415, 369 P .2d 250 ( 1962) ; Ex parte Langley,
325 P.2d 1094 (Okla. Crim. 1958). In the instant case
there was nothing to support the petitioner's contention that his plea was not voluntarily entered except
his own uncorroborated and vague testimony. On the
other hand the record of the arraignment proceedings
and the time between the alleged threats and the time
of plea tend to clearly indicate that the appellant's
plea was voluntarily entered and to support the trial
court's finding that appellant's contentions are without
legal merit.

11

POINT II
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION, THAT HE
SHOULD HA VE BEEN GRANTED RELIE}'
BY HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF AN AL.
LEGED FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COl;RT
TO ADVISE HI.M AS TO THE CO:\TSE.
QUENCES OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY, IS
WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT OR
LAW.

The appellant contends in Point II of his brief that
the trial court should have afforded him relief by habea~
corpus, and that he was not properly adYised as to the
possible consequences of his plea of guilty.

The record belies the contention that the appellanl
was not advised of the consequences of his plea. The
court expressly told the appellant that his plea of guilty
to the offense was a very serious matter which coula
result in his confinement in the State Prison. The courl
stated:
"You are charged here with a felony wl~icn
is a serious offense that could result by pumsh·
ment of being sent to the State Prison. If you
want an attorney you may have one?"

It is obvious that this advice clearly appraised the ap·
pellant that if he plead guilty, he could be confi~ea
in the State Prison. The appellant relies on Sect'.on
77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That section
provides:
"Where the defendant is not represented br·

12

counsel, the court shall not a c?epdt a plhea dof
·1t, until it shall have exp 1ame to t e egUI)
1"
fendant the consequences of sueh pea.
The appellant also relies on the case of State v. Ban, d l3 U.2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962). The facts
for ,
1 . d'
h
before the court in the instant case clear y m icate t at
the above quoted section ·was complied with by the
trial court before accepting the appellant's plea. The
ease of State v. Ranford in no way supports the position of the appellant. In that case the court iotated:
"The record shows that while appellant was
warned after his plea of guilty that he might not
receive probation, nothing was told him by the
court as to the consequences of a plea of guilty
or that such a plea would subject him to a term
in the state prison.''
In the instant case the appellant was very care-

fully appraised of the serious nature of his plea and
expressly advised that a plea of guilty could subject
him to confinement in the State Prison. Thus, the
situation in the Ranford case was inapposite to that
now before the court. Further, the record here reflects
that the appellant was not unfamiliar with criminal
proceedings. He had previously been before the juvenile court, confined in the State Industrial School and
exposed to police arrest on other occasions. Consequently, the appellant was not unfamiliar with the
possibilities of going to prison. Further, the court
ordered a presentence report and indicated that an
mvestigation would have to be made before any deter-

13

mination could be reached as to whether
should be placed on probation.

t}

1e

appe1la·1t1

The respondent contends that failure to
comph
with the provisions of Section 77-24-6 l~tal C :
'
.
I
Uil\
Annotated, 1953, should not be the basis for I 1
ladta1
corpus in every instance. The Ranford case inrolreri
direct appeal in an attempt to obtain collateral relief.
Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. In Thomp.
son v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 ( 1944), ti,h
court indicated that habeas corpus is much narrower
in scope than direct appeal and is limited to those j11 .
stances where there has been a substantial departure
from due process. This court stated:
" ... The writ of habeas corpus must not he
used to discover and correct all errors ,1·hicl1
might creep into a criminal trial. The time for
taking an appeal has wisely been limited by law.
If the writ of habeas corpus were to be used to
reach all defects in the trial which could be
raised by a timely appeal, no conviction could
ever become final. \Ve recognize that some errors
are more prejudicial to a defendant than are
others, but if habeas corpus is to be used to cor·
rect error, where can we draw the line? Shaula
we leave the determination as to when there Im
been and has not been sufficient error to war·
rant interference by the use of a writ of h.abeas
corpus entirely to the discretion of. each .iudge
based on standards which he mar mvoke from
his own mind? \Ve believe that the only sound
line that can be drawn is to restrict the ~1se 01
the writ of habeas corpus to the correction of
jurisdictional errors and to errors so gross a)

14

t · 1 effect depri\·e the defendant of his consti-

t~t:~nal substantive or procedural rights. Any-

thing short of that must be corrected on appeal
r by the Board of Pardons. And this of course
?. true ·whether the constitutional right is granted
;;Y the State Constitution o~ by. the F"e~eral
Constitution through absorpt10n m the Fourteenth Amendment."

Recentlv in Gulleyu~ 'l'. Turner, 17 U.2d 273, 400
P.2d 386 ( 1963). this court again acknowledged the
application of the principle in the Thompson case. This
court stated with reference to the validity of judgments:
" ... It is then not subject to attack under
habeas corpus or any other collateral proceeding
except in the most unusual circumstances: where
the court was without jurisdiction; or there has
been a substantial failure to accord the accused
due process of law; or perhaps for example
where it is indisputably shown that there is mistaken identity; or that there has been a knowing
and wilful falsification of the evidence by the
prosecutor; or some other such circumstance that
it would be whollv unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction."

Consequently, it is submitted that there is no basis for
habeas corpus because of a technical failure to intensil'ely advise a defendant pleading guilty as to all the
consequences of his plea unless it is apparent that there
was substantial likelihood, from what actually occurred,
that the defendant would not have understood the consequence of his plea or his rights would have been
otherwise inadequately protected. In the instant case
facts clearly demonstrate that the appellant was advised

15

of the consequences of his plea and did there ft .
a er w1tl1
full knowledge voluntarily enter a plea of guilty.
The appellant also assails the failure of ti
.
.
ie court
to fully advise the defendant of the elements of
. .
the
off ense. Th. is issue does not .app~ar in the pleadings
of the parties and apparently is raised for the fir st t'lllll
on appeal. Further, the record does not indicate that
there was any confusion in the mind of the appellant
as to his guilt. The appellant contends that the district
attorney's use of the word "asportation" in advisinr1
0
the court as to why the charge was grand larceny indicates that the appellant actually has a defense to the
crime to which he plead guilty. It is submitted that
this does not follow. Two elements are essential for botJ1
larceny and wrongful appropriation of an automobile.
Asportation is a common element to both and if the
intent is not one to steal, the offense of wrongful appro·
priation of an automobile may be appropriate. However, if the intent is otherwise, asportation no matter
how slight would be sufficient to provide for a conviction of grand larceny. Consequently, the district attar·
ney was merely advising the court that simply because
there may only have been a momentary asportation of
a vehicle, the appellant could still be guilty, assuming
the appropriate intent. Further it is worth noting that
nowhere in the record now before the court did the
appellant offer evidence of any confusion as to whether
he was in fact pleading to a proper charge.
Appellant calls the court's attention to some cases
he contends support the proposition for reversal. The

16

, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947),
case of
.
.

. h 11 inapplicable to the facts m this case. Even
Y·
.
· that case the court did not reverse outright but
W, ITT
•
, sent the matter back for further hearmg on the
rnere1\
tacts.· The evidence showed the failure of the court to
a oint counsel even though there had been a request
f~; counsel. It showed a failure to comply with the
most fundamental concepts of due process of law. A
simple reading of the case shows that it bears no relationship to the matter now before the court. Even so,
ou rehearing, the lower federal courts sustained the
judgment entered on a plea of guilty. Ex parte Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 72 F.Supp. 994 (D.C. E.D. Mich.);
Von Moltke v. United States, 189 F.2d 56 (6th Cir.
1951). It is interesting that in the latter case the court
observed:
!SW 0

"It is well settled that in a collateral attack
on a judgment in a proceeding of this nature
the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner fo
establish by a preponderance of evidence that
she did not competently and intelligently waive
her constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
(Cases cited.) The case \Vas remanded to the
J?istrict Court for a specific finding of fact, considered by the Supreme Court to be decisive
of the ruling in this case. This involved a clear
question of credibilitv of witnesses for the trial
judge. The credibilit:v of the witnesses is for
the trier of the facts. Hawk v. Olson, supra, 326
U.S. at page 279. 66 S. Ct. at page 120. Rule
52, Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.
\~ e ~re of the opinon that the findings of the
D1str1ct Judge on the factual issues disposed
17

of by him are amply supported b r th .
hereinabove referred to and th; e evidence
. ly approve d and accepted."
,
mg
·v are aeco ru·i
The instant case presented issues which ,
\\ere pr1.
marily for the determination of the trial court.
'
.

The record amply supports the trial cou rt'.s fu11J.
ings. The other cases cited by the appellant are 111..
relevant to the appellant's position in this case.
.

POINT Ill
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAI
THE APPELLANT 'VAIVED THE SER\"
ICES OF COUNSEL AT THE TIME HE EXTERED HIS PLEA OF GUILTY IS AMPLY
SUBSTANTIATED BY THE RECORD.
The record in the instant case clearly shows a full
and intelligent waiver of counsel by the appellant. 111

State v. Spiers, 12 U.2d 14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961), the

defendant, a nineteen year old boy, plead guilty to
the crime of second degree burglary. On appeal from
the denial of habeas corpus, this court said:
"The determining factor of whether appellan!
was convicted without due process of !aw 1s,
whether there has been an intelligent waiver ol
his right to counsel. This must depend. upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, mclud~
ing the background, experience and conduct 01
the accused.
"It is argued that the evidence shows t~iat
Spiers was only 19 years old, that he was im·
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mature for his age, that his I.Q. was only 75,
that he graduated f~om high school _with low
grades and was obnousl~· somewhat immature
for his age. The burden is upon the defendant
to show that he has been denied his constitutional
rights. The tr~al court, after . hear~ng t~e witnesses and seemg appellant give his testimony,
was in much better position than we to judge
his intelligence. There was no evidence of fear
or coercion, or any other reason why he was
induced to waive his rights other than that he
thourrht the course he took was for his best good.
Ther~ was nothing to indicate that at any stage
pf the proceedings he did not understand what
was going on, the questions asked, or the effect
of his waiver of counsel. In view of this situation
we conclude that the trial court's finding that
he intelligently waived his right to counsel must
be sustained."
The facts in this case show that the appellant was
advised of his right to counsel on three different occasions at the time of his arraignment before entering
his plea of guilty. By his own admission in answer to
the interrogatories, he had been advised of his right
to counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing. It
is obvious that the trial court could properly conclude
from the repeated advice given the appellant that he
definitely did not want counsel. In Strite v. Boles, 140
S.E.2d 611 ("\V. Va. 1965), the 'Vest Virginia Supreme
Court, in a comparable case, found an intelligent waiver
of counsel by the defendant. The court stated:

. "In ~he circumstances of this case the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
19

The right to the assistance of co
f d
1 .
unse1 wli']
un amenta right protected by the 'r .1.e u
0
of .the Fourteenth Amendment to th~ ~ 1 sio11i
tut10nal of the United States may b ~onit:.
·
· made
' intell'e waived
accuse d 1'f sueh waiver
is
ti f,.!
understandingly. State ex rel. Maige: anrl
·vvarden, \V. Va., 139 S.E.2d i 59 . Y · 0111·

1

"The order of the trial court referred t b
·
·1
'
oa ore
is not s1 ent. on the matter of counsel fo r th eut
cuse d . \V1th clarity it reveals that th
ft
. .
e court
a e~ exp 1ammg the nature of the charge and tiir
Pt.oss1ble fcoh:r:iseq.uehnces thereof, advised the pet~
10ner o
is rig t to the assistance of coun I
and offered such assistance. \Vith equal clar:t1
the order show.s that ~rith f~ll understanding
of . the ~ro~eedmg agamst him, the petitioner
waived his right to counsel. It is obvious that ;hi,
petitioner had full knowledge of the conse·
quences of his plea. \Vith complete understand·
ing he admitted his guilt and relied upon h~
request for probation."
The appellant argues that the court should have
advised him that he could have counsel even though he.
could not afford counsel. It is submitted that the con·
text of this record makes it obvious that appellant did
not desire counsel of any kind; and that although H
might have been a better practice to have giYen sucli
advice, the failure in this instance did not preclude an
intelligent waiver of counsel. Further, there is nothing
in the record that in any way indicates the appellant
was in fact indigent and could not have afforded coun·
sel. In the Application of John-son, 47 Cal. Rep. 17
(Calif. 1965), a similar issue was before the court. In
rejecting the position of the appellant, the court stated:
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" ... Despite the trial court's dereliction of
duty in this regar<l, however, i~ ~oes ~ot .appear
that any infringement of petitioners right to
counsel resulted therefrom. N ~ contenti~n. is
here made, it was not alleged m the petition,
and there was no showing in this proceeding or
in the lower court that petitioner was an indigent
or financially unable to employ counsel. In fact,
the shmving or inference from the record strongly
suggests that petitioner was :financially able to
do so.
"We recognize that petitioner was not required to make any claim or showing in the trial
court of finanical inability to employ counsel in
order to here complain of the court's failure to
advise him of the right to court appointed counsel. But it must be borne in mind that if he is
entitled to redress it is because he was deprived
of the right to such counsel and not simply because he was inadequately advised. The right
to court appointed counsel is a conditional one;
it exists only if the accused is financially unable
to employ counsel. Accordingly, in this proceeding if petitioner asserts his constitutional right
to court appointed counsel was infringed, it is
incumbent upon him to allege or show that he
was without ability to employ counsel since it
must be made to appear that the right exists
before there can be any claim of deprivation."
Other cases that support a finding of a valid waiver
of the constitutional right to counsel in this case are
Placorolle 'V. Maryland, 239 Md. 416, 2ll A.2d 828
(1965); Amsler v. H~kins, 2 Ohio St. 2d 229, 208 N.E.
2d 137 (1965); People v. De Blumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20
(1965).
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It is obvious from the record in the int8
ant ca1
that the trial court acted within the bound" f ti 1
. fi d.
h
~ o le en
dence m
n mg t at the appellant had been
.
. .
properJr.
advised of h1s rights to counsel and had intelligent!,
waived the same.
'

CONCLUSION
The record in the instant case clearly supports t;,,
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the tri:i'
court. These findings of fact and conclusions ,lf law 1rn,
not erroneous when examined against the state of ii1r
record in the instant case. The appellant was given em:
opportunity at the time he entered his plea of guilti; :,.
obtain the assistance of counsel and to protest his i1~
nocence if he saw fit. He voluntarily entered a pleaii
guilty and even thereafter, before sentencing, 1m
afforded the opportunity to have counsel and rejecttd
it. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for relie1
by habeas corpus.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE

Assistant Attorney General
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